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I. INTRODUCTION

Few issues challenge our legal system like juvenile justice. The
juvenile court was established as an alternative system to adult criminal
courts, whereby the juvenile judge was to act as a guardian to the
57
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wayward child and reform institutions were to replace prisons as a
means of punishment.1
But it has become increasingly clear that juveniles can—and
sometimes do—commit horrific crimes.2 In response, states across the
country passed tough-on-crime legislation.3 The enhanced penalties left
juveniles with the short end of both systems: subject to the vast
discretionary power of juvenile judges and without the procedural
safeguards of adult criminal courts.4
The Supreme Court of the United States responded. Over the last 50
years, the Court has made clear that young offenders are less culpable—
and must be treated differently—than adult offenders.5 And juveniles
must be afforded constitutional protections regardless of the system a
state uses to adjudicate a young offender.6
Because of the competing, yet equally important values at play, the
juvenile justice questions facing state supreme courts are often the most
difficult issues they tackle. Despite this complexity, Chief Justice
Maureen O’Connor has developed an effective framework to balance
these interests. The framework accounts for the objectives of the
juvenile court system—rehabilitation of juveniles and protection for the
child and society—and also considers the need for harsher sentencing of
violent juvenile offenders. In her analysis, Chief Justice O’Connor
acknowledges that the purpose of the juvenile system is not to
permanently mark juveniles as criminals.7 Her analysis also factors in
the rise in juvenile crime rates and the reality that not all juveniles are
susceptible to rehabilitation.8 Her framework, grounded in the
Constitution and the purpose of the juvenile system, ensures juveniles
receive consistent and well-reasoned treatment from Ohio courts while,
at the same time, effectuating the Ohio General Assembly’s policy

* Yvette McGee Brown is a partner at Jones Day in Columbus, Ohio and former Justice of the
Supreme Court of Ohio. Kimberly A. Jolson is an associate at Jones Day in Columbus, Ohio and
has advocated for juveniles’ rights before the Supreme Court of Ohio. The authors would like to
thank Ryan Harmanis for his helpful comments.
1. Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color:
The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 388-91 (2013).
2. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 976–77 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Julian Borger, U.S. Throws “Predator” Kids to the Wolves, GUARDIAN (Mar.
16, 2000, 8:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/17/julianborger.
4. See Henning, supra note 1, at 391-92.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-32 (1967).
7. See In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶¶ 66-67.
8. State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 9.
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choices.
Part II of this Article examines the growth of the juvenile justice
system as a system apart from the adult criminal system. It reviews the
goals of the juvenile court system—to treat children differently than
adults, to rehabilitate, and to protect both the child and society. Part II
also discusses the gradual movement to harsher sentencing of young
offenders and transferring those offenders to the adult criminal justice
system, as well as the subsequent exhortation of the United States
Supreme Court that youth in the juvenile justice system must be afforded
the protection of constitutional rights.9
Part III.A explains the framework that Chief Justice O’Connor has
applied consistently in juvenile-rights cases. In In re C.S., the Supreme
Court of Ohio held, in an opinion written by then-Justice O’Connor,10
that juveniles may waive their right to counsel only if, under a totalityof-the-circumstances analysis, the juvenile court concludes that the
juvenile received “meaningful advice” regarding the waiver.11 Part III.B
describes the importance of In re C.S., in that Ohio appellate courts have
applied its holding to assure meaningful pre-waiver advice to juveniles
and that important aspects of In re C.S.’s requirements have been
codified. Part III.C explores State v. D.W., in which the Supreme Court
of Ohio—again in an opinion written by Chief Justice O’Connor—
concluded that juveniles have a right to a hearing before being
transferred from the juvenile justice system to the adult criminal
system.12 The section also examines the Chief Justice’s arguments, in
dissent in In re M.W., that (1) juveniles have a statutory right to counsel,
under the Ohio Revised Code § 2151.352,13 during a police interrogation
and before a complaint is filed; and (2) the majority used an incorrect
constitutional analysis in determining whether juveniles have a
constitutional right to counsel in the context of police interrogation.14

9. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-15.
10. At the time In re C.S. was released in 2007, Chief Justice O’Connor was an associate
justice on the Ohio Supreme Court. She was elected to the Chief Justice position in 2010. For ease
of discussion, however, we refer to her as Chief Justice throughout this Article.
11. In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-4919 at ¶¶ 108-10.
12. D.W., 2012-Ohio-4544 at ¶ 21.
13. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 140 and Statewide
Issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)).
14. In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538, 978 N.E.2d 164, at ¶ 70 (O’Connor,
C.J., dissenting).
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II. JUVENILE LAW AND ITS INHERENT DIFFICULTIES
A.

Juvenile Law: A Very Brief History

During the latter part of the 19th century, a movement began to
establish a separate justice system for juveniles.15 Convinced that
society’s duty to a child should focus on rehabilitation, not
punishment,16 reformers developed a scheme wholly outside the criminal
law for adjudicating juvenile offenders.17 This unique system, rooted in
the doctrine of parens patriae, permitted the state to intervene when
parents were unable to discipline or care for their child.18
The first juvenile court was founded in Illinois in 1899,19 and the
concept quickly spread across the country, including to Ohio.20 The new
system, which the United States Supreme Court has called “peculiar,”21
15. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1967). For a more detailed history of the juvenile court in
the 19th century, see Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road
Not Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607, 616–21 (2013).
16. The juvenile court system grew out of the Progressive Movement, which focused on a
“Rehabilitative Ideal” with an emphasis on reforming the offender rather than punishing the offense.
See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
MINN. L. REV. 141, 148–49 (1984) (“The juvenile court professionals were to make discretionary,
individualized treatment decisions to achieve benevolent goals and social uplift by substituting a
scientific and preventative approach for the traditional punitive philosophy of the criminal law.”).
17. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-18.
18. Id. at 17-18. “The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a
fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems, by
paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise
institutions of the State provided guidance and help ‘to save him from a downward career.’” Id. at
25-26 (quoting Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909)); Drew
Darnell, Comment, Specialty Juvenile Courts in Texas: Using the Rehabilitative Juvenile Justice
Approach to Reform Texas’s Youngest Gang Members, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 715, 720 (2013); Ira M.
Schwartz, Neil Alan Weiner & Guy Enosh, Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court
Does Not Roll Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 535 (1998) (explaining that the
juvenile court was “expected to fulfill the complicated dual roles of the societal disciplinarian who
can punish children and of the parental substitute who can supervise, treat and rehabilitate and, if
necessary, care for the children”).
19. DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL
COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38 (1991).
20. The Supreme Court of Ohio first recognized the parental role of the court system when
adjudicating juveniles in 1869. Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184, 188 (1869). Following the
recognition of parens patriae, the first juvenile court in Ohio was established in 1902, and by 1906,
juvenile courts were used across the State. See In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808, 810 (Ohio 1969). By
1945, every state had implemented a juvenile justice system. See, e.g., CHAMPION & MAYS, supra
note 19.
21. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. The Court even suggested that while the doctrine of parens
patriae was “a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the
constitutional scheme,” there was “no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence.”
Id. at 16.
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quickly drew critics.22 Because its purpose was to rehabilitate rather than
punish, judicial discretion replaced procedural rules and formality.23
Although well-intentioned, this unbridled discretion led to juveniles’
loss of liberty without due process of law.24
Eventually, the Supreme Court of the United States stepped in,
issuing the landmark decision of In re Gault.25 The Court held that
constitutional protections apply to juvenile offenders, and proceedings
adjudicating them must satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.26 In re Gault’s holding—the extension of due process
rights to juveniles—laid the foundation for the consistent framework
Chief Justice O’Connor has developed for applying juvenile law in
Ohio.27
B.

Today’s Dilemma
Despite In re Gault’s laudatory pronouncements, juveniles commit

22. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (citing generally Joel F. Handler, The
Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7
(1965)) (“There is evidence . . . that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the
worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”). See also Sheldon Glueck, Some “Unfinished
Business” in the Management of Juvenile Delinquency, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 628, 629-30 (1964)
(listing numerous unanswered questions and concerns facing the juvenile court system).
23. See Sterling, supra note 15, at 619-20; Feld, supra note 2, at 971.
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 19-20 (1967) (“Failure to observe the fundamental requirements
of due process has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to
individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy.”).
See also id. at 20 n. 26.
25. Id. at 18 (“Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion,
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”). In re
Gault was the culmination of a series of decisions extending due process protections to juveniles.
See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (recognizing a juvenile’s due process interest in
juvenile court proceedings); Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (holding that a juvenile is entitled to a hearing on
whether juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived before being released to criminal court).
Further decisions clarified these due process rights, but In re Gault remains the seminal case on
juvenile law. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970) (holding that due process requires the
state to prove charges against a juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt).
26. Specifically, the Court granted juveniles in delinquency hearings the right to counsel,
notice, confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41,
55-57 (1967); see also Margot Adler, Gault Case Changed Juvenile Law, NPR (May 19, 2007),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10279166. However, the rights
granted to juveniles in Gault did not mirror the rights enjoyed by adults. See Sterling, supra note 15,
at 612 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41) (“Instead of applying the procedural protections of the
Bill of Rights, the Court extended juvenile delinquency respondents only Fourteenth Amendment
due process protections.”).
27. See infra Part III.A.2.
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a disturbing number of violent crimes.28 In response, many juvenile
judges shifted their focus toward punishment rather than rehabilitation.29
Similarly, state legislatures, including the Ohio General Assembly,
passed laws criminalizing juvenile conduct based on age or offense
without regard for the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice.30
Mandatory sentencing replaced the discretion of judges, and juveniles
often faced harsh punishment.31
Ohio previously had been at the forefront in treating juveniles
differently than adults.32 But after In re Gault, juvenile proceedings in
Ohio took a different turn. The Ohio General Assembly altered the
Juvenile Code and also granted the Supreme Court of Ohio authority to
create Rules of Juvenile Procedure.33 Consistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s decision, young offenders were afforded constitutional
protections in juvenile court.34 Even so, the corresponding punishments
juveniles received grew in length and severity.35
In addition, Ohio created a procedure by which a juvenile may—
and in some cases must—be transferred to adult criminal court.36 In
certain circumstances, transfer to criminal court is mandatory, leaving
judges no choice.37 However, when transfer is discretionary, the judge
must first find (1) the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in
the juvenile system; and (2) the safety of the community may require
that the child be subject to adult sanctions.38 Transfer to criminal court
has a host of ramifications, but the most damning to the juvenile is that
he may be sentenced to an adult facility.39 Despite these inherent
28. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILE
ARREST
RATE
TRENDS
(Feb.
25,
2014),
available
at
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05201.
29. See Borger, supra note 3.
30. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Juveniles Facing Lifelong Terms Despite Rulings, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/us/juveniles-facing-lifelong-terms-despiterulings.html.
31. Id. (noting that “states have adapted by imposing minimum mandatory terms . . . .”).
32. See In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808, 810 (Ohio 1969).
33. See WILLIAM A. KURTZ & PAUL C. GIANELLI, OHIO JUVENILE LAW 22, 24 (3d ed. 1994).
The Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure took effect on July 1, 1972. OHIO R. JUV. P. 47(A).
34. See Susan A. Burns, Comment, Is Ohio Juvenile Justice Still Serving Its Purpose?, 29
AKRON L. REV. 335, 349-52 (1996).
35. See id. at 341-49.
36. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.12 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 140 and Statewide
Issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)); OHIO R. JUV. P. 30.
37. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.12(A).
38. Id. § 2152.12(B). The juvenile court is required to take numerous factors into account
when considering discretionary transfer. Id. § 2152.12(B)-(E).
39. Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP
Sentences, 10 J. L. FAM. STUD. 11, 38 (2007).
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difficulties, Chief Justice O’Connor nimbly addressed the maelstrom of
competing interests, conflicting motivations, and grave consequences,
emerging with a workable framework for Ohio courts to follow.
II. CHIEF JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S JUVENILE LAW JURISPRUDENCE AND
ITS IMPACT
The Supreme Court of Ohio has grappled regularly with juvenile
justice during Chief Justice O’Connor’s tenure.40 The Court, as the third
branch of government, is charged with applying the law in a manner
consistent with the state and federal constitutions. While this limited role
requires a delicate balancing act, Chief Justice O’Connor has managed
to craft a consistent framework that gives due weight to the rehabilitative
purpose of juvenile law and the reality that juveniles commit heinous
offenses. In In re C.S., she identified a framework that balances the
historical goals of juvenile courts with the modern realities of juvenile
sanctions, including the potential long-term deprivation of liberty.41 In re
C.S. stands as a guidepost for courts to follow and has ensured
constitutional procedures for juveniles in Ohio.
A.

In re C.S.

In 2007, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in an opinion by Chief Justice
O’Connor, held that a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding may waive
his constitutional right to counsel only after consulting with a parent,
guardian, or attorney.42 Chief Justice O’Connor’s analysis examined the
history and purpose of the juvenile system, constitutional doctrine,
statutory construction, the jurisprudence in other states, and the fact that
most parents and especially juveniles are unfamiliar with the legal
process.43
The court held that the juvenile in In re C.S. did not properly waive
his right to counsel.44 Chief Justice O’Connor analyzed the adequacy of
the juvenile’s waiver based on United States Supreme Court precedent
regarding the due process rights of juveniles, the Ohio General
Assembly’s intent in passing § 2151.352 of the Ohio Revised Code, and
40. See, e.g., In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203; Rowell v.
Smith, 133 Ohio St.3d 288, 2012-Ohio-4313, 978 N.E.2d 146; State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434,
2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894; In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538, 978 N.E.2d
164.
41. See generally In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177.
42. Id. at ¶ 98.
43. Id. at ¶¶ 65-103.
44. Id. at ¶ 122.
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the importance of having legal counsel.45 Because of the significance of
counsel and a juvenile’s right to representation, Chief Justice O’Connor
reasoned that the waiver must be meaningful in light of the attendant
circumstances.46
1. The Facts
Unfortunately the facts of In re C.S. are all too common. C.S., a
minor of almost 14 years old, was no stranger to the justice system.
Already on probation for assault, he found himself before a magistrate
on two counts of grand theft.47 Before the hearing, the court sent C.S.
and his mother documents that included information on the right to
counsel and court-appointed attorneys.48 C.S. and his mother signed a
form acknowledging this right, but waiving the assistance of counsel.49
During the hearing, the magistrate questioned C.S.50 The minor
acknowledged his right to counsel and indicated an understanding that
he had waived that right.51 His mother similarly affirmed such
knowledge and waiver, expressing her desire that C.S. be placed in the
same juvenile facility as his brother.52 Later, C.S. admitted to the
wrongdoing, and the magistrate adjudicated him delinquent and
sentenced him to a minimum one-year commitment to the Ohio
Department of Youth Services.53
2. Analysis
On appeal, the Court had to determine whether C.S.’s waiver of
counsel was valid.54 To answer this question, Chief Justice O’Connor
undertook a comprehensive examination of the juvenile system,
constitutional precedent, and legislative history and intent.55 Combining
45. Id. at ¶¶ 77-98.
46. Id. at ¶¶ 113-14.
47. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.
48. Id. at ¶¶ 5-8. Incidentally, the notice provision in these documents required C.S. and his
mother to contact the clerk seven days before the hearing. Because the hearing was held less than
two days after C.S. was taken into custody, C.S. and his mother could not have complied with the
notice provision. See id.
49. Id. at ¶ 8.
50. Id. at ¶¶ 10-61.
51. Id. at ¶¶ 11-16.
52. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18, 121. In fact, the magistrate believed the “plan” was for C.S. to be arrested
and go to the same facility as his brother. Id. at ¶ 61.
53. Id. at ¶ 61.
54. Id. at ¶ 64.
55. Id. at ¶¶ 65-115.
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these concepts into one, the Chief Justice applied a framework that she
has returned to time and again. This important framework requires
consideration of the juvenile justice system, legislative intent, and the
Constitution.
a. The Juvenile System
Chief Justice O’Connor began by reviewing the purpose of juvenile
courts, “which occupy a unique place in our legal system.” 56 “[J]uvenile
courts were premised on profoundly different assumptions and goals
than a criminal court” and “eschewed traditional, objective criminal
standards and retributive notions of justice.”57 Unlike criminal courts,
juvenile courts were intended to “protect the wayward child” and
rehabilitate, rather than prosecute.58 Thus, “juvenile courts adopted
proceedings that were less formal and more inquisitorial than
adversarial.”59
But, as the Chief Justice noted, the reality of juvenile courts did not
fulfill the original vision.60 Instead, juvenile courts often doled out the
“worst of both worlds,” providing “neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.”61 Therefore, the Chief Justice explained, the United States
Supreme Court intervened.62 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court
affirmed juveniles’ due process rights and held that juveniles, like adults,
must be informed of certain rights—including the right to counsel.63
Importantly, because juvenile proceedings are civil, the juvenile’s right
to counsel is not governed by the Sixth Amendment—as it would be in
criminal court—but instead by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.64
Chief Justice O’Connor recognized the “inherent tension” between
the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and the increasing
criminalization of juvenile offenses.65 Indeed, although the Ohio General
Assembly “adhered to the core tenets of the juvenile system,” it also
“made substantive changes to the Juvenile Code in a get-tough response
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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Id. at ¶ 66 (internal citations omitted).
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Id. (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)).
Id. See also infra Part II.A.
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See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-4919 at ¶ 75.
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to increasing juvenile caseloads, recidivism, and the realization that the
harms suffered by victims are not dependent upon the age of the
perpetrator.”66
With this backdrop, the Chief Justice emphasized the need to
reconcile the original purpose of the juvenile court system with its
present form: “We . . . abide by the principles that underlie the founding
of the juvenile courts, but we do so with pragmatism and an
understanding of modern realities.”67
b. The Juvenile’s Constitutional Right to Counsel
Chief Justice O’Connor then considered the statute at hand, which
provided that a juvenile is entitled to legal representation, and “[i]f a
party appears without counsel, the courts shall ascertain whether the
party knows of the party’s right to counsel and of the party’s right to be
provided with counsel if the party is an indigent person.”68 With the right
to counsel firmly established, the Court needed to determine: (1)
whether a juvenile may waive that right; and (2) if so, what test to apply
to determine the waiver’s validity.69 C.S. argued that juveniles have a
non-waivable right to counsel, and therefore the statute was
unconstitutional.70
First, the Chief Justice examined a number of factors to decide
whether a juvenile could waive the right to counsel. Taking into account
statutory language, history (including the context in which the statute
was adopted), and constitutional requirements, the Court concluded a
“juvenile may waive his rights, including his right to counsel . . . but
only if the juvenile is advised by a parent in considering waiver.” 71 The
Court explained that this conclusion was not only true to constitutional
principles and legislative intent, but also “reinforce[d] the vital role a
parent can play in a delinquency proceeding.”72
Next, Chief Justice O’Connor applied the traditional standard for an
effective waiver to juveniles: an “‘intentional relinquishment or
66. Id. at ¶ 74.
67. Id. at ¶ 75.
68. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 140 and Statewide
Issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)).
69. In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-4919 at ¶ 64.
70. Id. at ¶ 86. C.S. argued that former Ohio Revised Code § 2151.352—which stated that
“[c]ounsel must be provided for a child not represented by the child’s parent, guardian, or
custodian”—implicitly and improperly permitted a child’s parent (or guardian or custodian) to
substitute for legal representation in juvenile court. Id.
71. Id. at ¶ 95.
72. Id. at ¶ 102.
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abandonment of a known right’”73 that is “voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.”74 To determine whether a waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, the Chief Justice established the “totality-of-thecircumstances analysis” as the “proper test” for a valid waiver by a
juvenile.75 She then enumerated a host of factors courts must consider:
[T]he age, intelligence, and education of the juvenile; the juvenile’s
background and experience generally and in the court system specifically; the presence or absence of the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or
custodian; the language used by the court in describing the juvenile’s
rights; the juvenile’s conduct; the juvenile’s emotional stability; and
76
the complexity of the proceedings.

Chief Justice O’Connor concluded that “the degree to which the
juvenile’s parent is capable . . . and willing to assist the juvenile in the
waiver analysis” is a “key factor” in analyzing the validity of a waiver. 77
This emphasis on the willingness and ability of the parent to assist the
juvenile has important ramifications for the way the totality of the
circumstances test is applied in Ohio.
c. “Totality of the Circumstances” Applied
Chief Justice O’Connor then turned to the facts of the case.78
Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test, she found that although
C.S. and his mother had signed the “right papers,” the record was
unclear as to whether C.S. had relinquished his rights knowingly and
intelligently: “An important aspect of our consideration in this case is
our concern that there was not any meaningful advice rendered to C.S. in
his decision to waive counsel.”79 In particular, the Court was not
satisfied that C.S.’s mother “was in a position to render any meaningful
advice to her son in this case” because she had not spoken to C.S. since
his arrest or reviewed his police report.80 Thus, the court determined
C.S.’s right to counsel had not been legally waived.81

73. Id. at ¶ 105 (quoting State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470,
at ¶ 31 (internal citations omitted)).
74. Id. at ¶ 106 (citing State v. Gibson, 345 N.E.2d 399, 400 (Ohio 1976)).
75. Id. at ¶ 108 (following In re Dalton S., 730 N.W.2d 816, 824-25 (Neb. 2007)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at ¶ 110. Although the Chief Justice was careful to note that this factor was not
dispositive, part of the Court interpreted it as an additional requirement. See infra Part III.A.3.
78. In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-4919 at ¶¶ 116-23.
79. Id. at ¶ 119.
80. Id.
81. Id. at ¶ 122.
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Chief Justice O’Connor concluded by remarking that the case was
“difficult” and that the magistrate’s “clear frustration” with C.S was
understandable.82 Nevertheless, the Chief Justice was steadfast in her
commitment to applying due process to juveniles in keeping with the
Constitution: “[T]hat frustration, and the judge’s broad discretion in
imposing disposition, cannot override the need for the careful
consideration of the fairness and due process rights that Gault demands
and the application of those principles in all delinquency cases.”83
3. The Dissents
Two justices dissented. Justice O’Donnell, writing for himself only,
agreed that a juvenile has a right to counsel, that it can be waived, and
that the totality-of-the-circumstances test applied.84 However, Justice
O’Donnell would have come to a different conclusion in C.S.’s case. He
saw the majority’s reasoning as “invad[ing] the province of a parent’s
role in raising his or her child” and, thus, concurred with Justice
Lanzinger’s dissent.85
Justice Lanzinger’s dissent was likewise narrow, but its proposed
framework deviated slightly from Chief Justice O’Connor’s opinion.
Justice Lanzinger, joined by Justice O’Donnell, agreed with the
majority’s conclusion that C.S. had the right to counsel and that the
totality-of-the-circumstances test should be used in ascertaining the
validity of a waiver.86 However, she disagreed with the majority’s focus
on parental intent, believing it incorrectly required “meaningful advice”
from a parent prior to a valid waiver.87 Justice Lanzinger preferred to
view parental advice as one of the factors in the inquiry, rather than a
separate requirement.88 Using this slightly modified framework, Justice
Lanzinger would have found the waiver sufficient.89
After examining the dissents, a common thread emerges: all of the
justices—even those who disagreed with the result—adhered to Chief
Justice O’Connor’s framework and its underlying reasoning. It is this
82. Id. at ¶ 123.
83. Id.
84. Id. at ¶ 124 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at ¶ 125. Justice O’Donnell believed the majority placed too much weight on C.S.’s
mother’s expressed desire to have both her children housed in the same juvenile facility, and that
“[n]othing in the record . . . suggests incompetence or failure of this mother to act in the best
interests of her child.” Id. at ¶ 126.
86. Id. at ¶¶ 130-33 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at ¶ 133.
88. Id.
89. Id. at ¶ 135.
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framework that has allowed In re C.S. to become the seminal case that
Ohio courts consistently apply when grappling with juvenile law.
B.

In re C.S.’s Impact

At first blush, In re C.S. may seem less than remarkable. Chief
Justice O’Connor applied settled United States Supreme Court precedent
and utilized a tried-and-true test to determine a waiver’s validity.90 Even
the dissents were narrow, mainly disagreeing about how to apply the
majority’s test to particular facts.91 Despite its unassuming nature, In re
C.S. has had a lasting impact because it requires that, in the totality of
circumstances analysis, a court must consider not only whether a
juvenile conferred with his or her parent, but also “the degree to which
the juvenile’s parent is capable . . . and willing to assist the juvenile in
the waiver analysis.”92 This second requirement ensures that courts
probe whether a juvenile in fact received adequate assistance before
waiving any constitutional rights.
1. In re C.S. Applied
Since In re C.S. was decided, Ohio courts have applied the totalityof-the-circumstances test numerous times to determine the validity of a
juvenile’s waiver of counsel.93 While this may be a common legal test,
the manner in which Chief Justice O’Connor applied it to C.S.’s case has
made a difference in the lives of juveniles by holding juvenile courts to
an appropriately high standard. Three cases stand out.
a. In re Ramon
Shortly after the Supreme Court of Ohio decided In re C.S., the
Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Third District had to determine the
validity of a juvenile’s waiver of counsel.94 In In re Ramon, the State of
Ohio filed a complaint against a juvenile for receiving stolen property.95
During Ramon’s initial appearance on the delinquency complaint, the

90. See infra Part III.A.2.
91. See infra Part III.A.3.
92. In re C. S., 2007-Ohio-4919 at ¶ 110.
93. See infra Part II.B-C. Beyond the typical juvenile delinquency hearing, In re C.S. has
been applied to determine the validity of waivers of counsel in other court proceedings, including
probation revocation hearings. See, e.g., In re L.A.B., 121 Ohio St.3d 112, 2009-Ohio-354, 902
N.E.2d 471, at ¶¶ 56-57 (2009).
94. In re Ramon, No. 4-07-03, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5080, at *6-7 (Oct. 29, 2007).
95. Id. at *3.
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juvenile judge accepted the juvenile’s waiver of counsel.96 The judge
informed Ramon of “the right to have an attorney,” and if he wanted to
“consult with an attorney . . . [the hearing could] be postponed.”97 The
judge added that if Ramon and his parents were unable to afford an
attorney, one would be appointed at the county’s expense.98 The judge
next asked if Ramon had discussed the complaint with his parents, and
Ramon confirmed he had.99 Finally, Ramon and his father each indicated
on the record a desire to proceed without counsel.100
At the adjudicatory hearing a few weeks later, the juvenile court
and Ramon had the following exchange:
Court: . . . When we were here the last time, you guys elected to go
ahead without counsel and I did tell you about subpoena’s at that point,
right? Okay, you ready to proceed?
Ramon: Yes, sir.

101

The State contended that Ramon understood his rights because he had
been before the juvenile court “numerous times.”102 Further, the State
argued for the waiver’s validity because Ramon’s parents had the
financial means to hire counsel if they so desired.103
The Third District Court of Appeals applied In re C.S. and
disagreed.104 Noting that “a juvenile court has a special duty when a
juvenile waives their right to counsel,” the Court concluded that the
colloquies from previous dealings in juvenile court did not demonstrate
that Ramon’s parents were in a “position to render meaningful advice on
the waiver of counsel.”105 In other words, Ramon’s father’s presence
was not enough. The juvenile court was required to “thoroughly address
[and] investigate” the relevant factors to “determine whether Ramon

96. Id. at *7, *14.
97. Id. at *12.
98. Id. at *12-13. The appellate court also took issue with the juvenile court’s representation
to Ramon that counsel could only be appointed if his parents were unemployed. Id. at *14. Juvenile
courts in Ohio are to determine a child’s indigence independent from their parents. See OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 120-1-03(C)(5) (2009) (“Juveniles are presumed indigent. In determining the
eligibility of a child for court-appointed counsel in juvenile court, only the juvenile’s income shall
be considered when determining if counsel should be appointed.”).
99. In re Ramon, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5080, at *13.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *14.
105. Id. at *7, *14.
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knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.”106
Something more—in fact, much more—was needed.107
b. In re J.F.
The following year, the Second District Court of Appeals of Ohio
faced the remarkably similar case of In re J.F.108 J.F., who had appeared
in juvenile court previously, acknowledged an understanding of his right
to counsel and stated on the record that he wished to proceed without
representation.109 And—mirroring In re C.S. and In re Ramon—J.F.’s
mother was present and acquiesced to the waiver, requesting only
continued treatment for her son.110 Despite the mother’s presence, the
Second District acted in accordance with Chief Justice O’Connor’s
framework and found the waiver of counsel invalid.111
The Court followed In re C.S.’s instruction to determine “the
degree to which the juvenile’s parent is capable of assisting and willing
to assist the juvenile in the waiver analysis.”112 Applying the totality-ofthe-circumstances test, the Court found “no indication” that J.F.’s
mother had counseled her son about the ramifications of waiving his
right to counsel. Because J.F. had not been advised about the
consequences of his decision, the waiver was invalid.113
c. In re E.C.
More recently, the Seventh District Court of Appeals came to the
same conclusion.114 E.C. requested representation at a delinquency
hearing, but told the juvenile court her mother could not afford it.115
After questioning E.C.’s mother on her income, the juvenile court
incorrectly told E.C. she did not qualify for court-appointed counsel at
106. Id. at *15-16.
107. Id. at *15 (quoting In re Bays, Nos. 2002-CA-52, 2002-CA-56, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS
1175, at *11 (Mar. 14, 2003)) (“To be valid such a waiver must be made with an apprehension of
the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable
punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and other circumstances in mitigation
thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.”).
108. In re J.F., 178 Ohio App.3d 702, 2008-Ohio-4325, 900 N.E.2d 204.
109. Id. at ¶ 35-40.
110. Id. at ¶ 56.
111. Id. at ¶ 4.
112. Id. at ¶ 91 (quoting In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at
¶ 110).
113. Id. at ¶ 4.
114. In re E.C., No. 09-NO-366, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5377, at *10–11 (Dec. 15, 2011).
115. Id. at *8.
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the county’s expense.116 Following this exchange, E.C. waived her right
to counsel.117
Although her mother was present, the Seventh District was not
convinced the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.118
Because her mother was not asked whether “she believed [her daughter]
understood her constitutional rights,” and because E.C. “was never
advised of possible defenses to the alleged violations or circumstances
that might mitigate her potential punishment,” the waiver was invalid.119
2. Codification of In re C.S.
With Chief Justice O’Connor’s framework successfully
implemented in Ohio courts, the next step was to firmly establish it in
Ohio’s formal juvenile law procedure.
On July 1, 2012, In re C.S.’s impact grew. The case’s holding was
incorporated into Rule 3 of the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure in
recognition of the significant consequences juveniles face in delinquency
adjudications.120 Rule 3(D) now reads:
Any waiver of the right to counsel shall be made in open court, recorded, and in writing. In determining whether a child has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel, the court shall
look to the totality of the circumstances including, but not limited to:
the child’s age; intelligence; education; background and experience
generally and in the court system specifically; the child’s emotional
stability; and the complexity of the proceedings. The Court shall ensure that a child consults with a parent, custodian, guardian, or guardian ad litem, before any waiver of counsel. However, no parent, guardian, custodian, or other person may waive the child’s right to
121
counsel.

Further, a juvenile’s right to counsel may not be waived “when there is a
conflict or disagreement between the child and the parent, guardian, or
116. Id. at *9-10. The juvenile court repeated the mistake made in In re Ramon by using a
parent’s income to determine whether the juvenile was indigent. See former OHIO ADMIN. CODE §
120-1-03(D) (2008) (amended 2009) (“In determining eligibility of a child for court-appointed
counsel in juvenile court, only the child’s income shall initially be considered.”). E.C., who
estimated her net worth at “[a] thousand dollars probably,” would almost certainly have been
deemed indigent. In re E.C., 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5377, at *9, *13; OHIO ADMIN. CODE 120-103(C) (2009).
117. In re E.C., 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5377, at *10.
118. Id. at *10-11.
119. Id. at *12–15.
120. OHIO R. JUV. P. 3.
121. Id. at 3(D).
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custodian; or if the parent, guardian, or custodian requests that the child
be removed from the home.”122
The Staff Notes make clear that the revised rule “is intended to
implement a process for the mandates of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision In re Gault, and the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision
In re C.S., to ensure children have meaningful access to counsel and are
able to make informed decisions about their legal representation.”123 To
that end, the rule also requires a child facing felony charges to “[meet]
privately with an attorney to discuss the child’s right to counsel and the
disadvantages of self-representation.”124
C.

In re C.S.’s Progeny

Even though In re C.S. dealt with a waiver of counsel issue, the
strength of Chief Justice O’Connor’s framework lies in its broad
applicability to various juvenile justice issues. In 2012, the Supreme
Court of Ohio revisited juvenile justice in two important, but different,
cases. One case dealt with a juvenile’s ability to waive a hearing
regarding a discretionary transfer from the juvenile court system to the
adult criminal justice system.125 The second dealt with the scope of a
juvenile’s right to counsel and whether it extends to the time before
juvenile court proceedings begin.126 Both demonstrate the Chief Justice’s
consistency in balancing difficult, competing interests in juvenile justice
cases.
1. State v. D.W.
In an opinion by Chief Justice O’Connor herself, the Court
addressed the most damaging outcome for a juvenile: transfer to adult
court and the possibility of incarceration in an adult prison.127 The
statutory scheme of Ohio Revised Code § 2152.12 provides for two
types of transfer: mandatory and discretionary.128 If transfer is
discretionary, an amenability hearing must be held to determine a
122. Id. at 3(A)(3).
123. OHIO R. JUV. P. 3 staff notes.
124. OHIO R. JUV. P. 3(C).
125. State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894.
126. In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538, 978 N.E.2d 164.
127. D.W., 2012-Ohio-4544 at ¶ 5-6. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.12 (West,
Westlaw through Files 1 to 140 and Statewide Issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)) (allowing
juvenile courts to transfer certain juveniles to adult court to face criminal sanctions).
128. D.W., 2012-Ohio-4544 at ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Hanning, 728 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (Ohio
2000)).
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juvenile’s eligibility for transfer.129 In State v. D.W., the Court had to
decide whether a juvenile may waive his right to an amenability hearing
and, if so, the contours of a valid waiver.130
Chief Justice O’Connor wrote for a unanimous Court and took a
familiar path. As in In re C.S., she began with the history of the juvenile
system and United States Supreme Court precedent.131 In particular, she
noted that “[t]he objectives of the juvenile court ‘are to provide
measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for
society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.”‘132
Further, she recognized the United States Supreme Court’s separate
treatment of juveniles because of their “diminished culpability.”133 The
Chief Justice then compared these principles to the Ohio statute, which
had been enacted “in response to a rise in rates and severity of juvenile
crime and the belief that not all juveniles can be rehabilitated.”134
With these important but divergent principles in mind, the Chief
Justice explored the purpose of an amenability hearing.135 She explained
that it is a “critical stage of the juvenile proceedings” because it “affects
whether the juvenile faces a delinquency adjudication, or adult criminal
sanctions and the label ‘felon.’”136 Thus, the Chief Justice had “no doubt
that a juvenile’s right to an amenability hearing, like a juvenile’s right to
counsel, is compelled by federal due process protections.”137
However, like the right to counsel articulated in In re C.S., the right
to an amenability hearing is not absolute.138 A juvenile may waive the
right so long as certain precautions are taken:
An amenability hearing under R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) may be waived provided (1) the juvenile, through counsel, expressly states on the record a
waiver of the amenability hearing and (2) the juvenile court engages in

129. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.
130. Id. at ¶ 6.
131. Id. at ¶¶ 7-9; see also Part III.A.2.(a).
132. D.W., 2012-Ohio-4544 at ¶ 7 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966)).
133. Id. at ¶ 8 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012)).
134. Id. at ¶ 9.
135. Id. at ¶ 12.
136. Id. (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 560).
137. Id. at ¶ 21. As in In re C.S., the Chief Justice’s analysis was rooted in precedent from the
Supreme Court of the United States, which emphasized the importance of due process rights in
amenability hearings nearly 50 years ago. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 557. In Kent, the Court found that
juveniles must have access to effective counsel in the context of a waiver hearing. Id. at 561 (“The
right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic
requirement. It is the essence of justice. Appointment of counsel without affording an opportunity
for hearing on a ‘critically important’ decision is tantamount to denial of counsel.”).
138. D.W., 2012-Ohio-4544 at ¶ 21.
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a colloquy on the record with the juvenile to determine that the waiver
139
was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

However, the Chief Justice concluded the juvenile court failed to
conduct an amenability hearing based on the mistaken belief that one
was not necessary, and thus waiver of the amenability hearing was never
addressed.140 The case was therefore remanded for an amenability
hearing or a proper waiver of such hearing.141 Chief Justice O’Connor
held that a valid waiver of an amenability hearing requires the waiver to
“be expressly stated on the record by the juvenile, through counsel, and
the juvenile court must determine, through colloquy with the juvenile,
that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”142
2. In re M.W.
The day before her opinion in State v. D.W. was released, Chief
Justice O’Connor found herself in an unfamiliar position: issuing the
dissent in a juvenile justice case.143 Chief Justice O’Connor reiterated the
holding in In re C.S., which concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment
governs a juvenile’s right to counsel.144 Her dissenting opinion reminds
the majority that the Sixth Amendment does not control a juvenile’s
right to counsel.145 The Chief Justice concluded that the majority holding
defied Ohio Supreme Court precedent regarding juvenile constitutional
rights and § 2151.352 of the Ohio Revised Code.146 Justice O’Donnell—
who had dissented in In re C.S.—wrote for the majority.147
In In re M.W., the Court had to resolve “whether a juvenile has a
statutory right to counsel during a police interrogation conducted before
139. Id. at ¶ 47.
140. Id. at ¶ 48.
141. Id.
142. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.
143. In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538, 978 N.E.2d 164 (O’Connor, C.J.,
dissenting).
144. Id. at ¶ 43.
145. Id.
146. Id. at ¶¶ 69-70; see also Cara A. Gardner, Failing to Serve and Protect: A Proposal for
an Amendment to A Juvenile’s Right to A Parent, Guardian, or Custodian During A Police
Interrogation After State v. Oglesby, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1685, 1698-99 (2008) (citing In re C.S., 115
Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 96) (advocating for parental guidance
through the waiver process because juveniles are vulnerable due to unfamiliarity with the legal
system and susceptibility to interrogation); Francine T. Sherman, Justice for Girls: Are We Making
Progress?, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1584, 1596 (2012) (citing In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-4919 at ¶ 111)
(acknowledging a move in state and federal courts to acknowledge juvenile competency in
determining whether a juvenile can stand trial and how to appropriately sentence juveniles).
147. In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538, 978 N.E.2d 164.
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a complaint is filed or an appearance is made in juvenile court.”148
Section 2151.352 of the Ohio Revised Code provides a right to counsel
“at all stages of the proceedings,” and thus the case turned on the
definition and scope of the term “proceedings.”149 The majority held that
“proceedings” was limited to court proceedings, and therefore the right
to counsel attached only after the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was
invoked.150
The majority curiously chose not to address “any constitutional
right to counsel or the issue of waiver.”151 Instead, it distinguished
between a juvenile’s right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.152 Based on the majority’s framework, juveniles have a
Fifth Amendment right to counsel at arrest only if they exercise that
right, while the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after
court proceedings begin.153 Thus, because M.W. was interrogated before
court proceedings were initiated and had not explicitly requested
counsel, he validly waived his Miranda right to representation.154
Chief Justice O’Connor wrote an impassioned dissent. She began
by taking the majority’s interpretation of “proceedings” to task.155
Relying on a variety of sources, she concluded that the meaning of
“proceedings” in the statute was ambiguous and could not be so easily
limited to court proceedings.156
With even more force, she criticized the majority for using an
incorrect framework.157 The Fourteenth Amendment—not the Sixth
Amendment, as the majority held—applied to juveniles’ right to
counsel.158 And that distinction, the Chief Justice explained, made all the
difference: “Because it is founded in due process, the juvenile’s right to
counsel in proceedings is a malleable right rather than a rigid one; it is
driven by concerns for fundamental fairness.”159 Further, she disagreed
with the majority’s easy dismissal of the constitutional right at issue,
noting that “[t]he Miranda warning is more than fodder for television
and movie depictions of police work . . . [its] protection is critical for all
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 20.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶¶ 36-40 (O’Connor C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 41-43.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 43.
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individuals, but particularly for juveniles.”160
She called upon her analysis in In re C.S., where the Court “clearly
enunciated [its] protective philosophy of juvenile justice that recognizes
the realities of modern delinquency proceedings.”161 The Chief Justice
then did what the majority failed to do—she put all of the puzzle pieces
together:
The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2151.352 in response to a series
of directives from the United States Supreme Court calling for courts
to ensure fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings, including protecting juveniles’ right, from custodial interrogation through adjudication, not to incriminate themselves. Given those purposes, the majority’s construction of R.C. 2151.352 improperly vitiates the very
purpose of the statute and thus violates the canon of statutory construction that forbids reading statutes in a manner that leads to absurd results or that defeats the purpose for which the statute was passed. More
importantly, it offends fundamental notions of due process and fair162
ness.

In re M.W. demonstrates that some juvenile constitutional rights
remain underdeveloped, but consistent application of Chief Justice
O’Connor’s framework offers juveniles access to the full spectrum of
due process protections they are intended to have.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fundamental fairness requires consistency. With In re C.S. as a
roadmap, Chief Justice O’Connor’s juvenile law decisions always take
the same path. That path—based on precedent from the Supreme Court
of the United States and the Ohio Supreme Court, legislative intent, and
the very purpose of the juvenile justice system—demonstrates her
commitment to the United States and Ohio Constitution and her role as
an interpreter, rather than a maker of the law.
The analysis in In re C.S. has been routinely applied to determine
the validity of a juvenile’s waiver of counsel. The rule was then codified
and now continues to have broad applicability to various juvenile justice
issues. Consistent application of Chief Justice O’Connor’s framework
will continue to balance the tension between the rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile justice system, constitutional requirements, and the severity
of some juvenile crimes. In addition to the benefits realized by the
160.
161.
162.
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justice system as a whole, Chief Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudence has
ensured constitutional juvenile due process rights in Ohio.
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